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Abstract – Individual transferable quotas (ITQ) were implemented in the Tasmanian red rock lobster fishery in 1998
and ten years later we assessed the impacts on the fishery. Particular attention was devoted to investigating the perfor-
mances of the fishery with regard to three features identified as major impacts in the literature: rationalization of the
fishing fleet, change in fishing strategy in order to maximise the fisher’s profit and concentration of fishing rights and
activity. On average, the fishery reacted as expected and reached its objective in terms of reconstruction of the biomass,
but the overall assessment in terms of resulting profitability is not very conclusive. There is no evidence of decrease of
the profitability over the period of the study but the fishery is more reactive to external factors on its export market in
China than to changes in its own structure.
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Résumé – En 1998, les quotas individuels transférables ont été mis en place dans la pêcherie de langouste rouge
de Tasmanie et dix ans plus tard, nous avons évalué leur impact sur la pêcherie. Nous avons accordé une importance
particulière à l’étude des performances de la pêcherie au niveau de trois caractéristiques, identifiées par une recherche
bibliographique, comme des eﬀets majeurs de ces quotas individuels transférables : rationalisation de la flottille de
pêche, changements dans les stratégies de pêche afin de maximiser le profit des pêcheurs et concentration des droits et
de l’activité de pêche. En moyenne, la pêcherie a réagi conformément aux prévisions et a atteint ses objectifs en terme
de reconstruction de la biomasse ; cependant, le bilan global en terme de profitabilité est mitigé. Il n’y a pas de signe de
diminution de la profitabilité au cours de la période étudiée mais la pêcherie est plus réactive aux stimulus externes sur
son marché d’exportation, la Chine, qu’aux changements survenus dans sa propre structure.
1 Introduction
The state of world fisheries is alarming, with half of the
global fish stocks reported as fully exploited and a further quar-
ter as either overexploited or depleted (FAO 2007), reducing
the long-term economic benefits derived from fishing (Clark
2006; Hilborn 2007). There is growing international consen-
sus on the central role of the “race for fish” in the develop-
ment of excess harvesting. The common-pool status of ma-
rine fish stocks leads to the existence of reciprocal negative
a Corresponding author: katell.hamon@ifremer.fr
externalities between fishing operators (Hardin 1968). These
externalities entail a divergence between individually and so-
cially optimal choices and the development of excess fishing
capacity. Fishers tend to invest in more powerful and eﬃcient
fishing gear and techniques in order to stay in the race, leading
to economic ineﬃciency, conflicts and social disruption and,
in many cases, to the depletion of fish stocks beyond safe bio-
logical limits (Thébaud et al. 2007).
These diﬃculties are not new and have led to the develop-
ment of fisheries management policies which can be broadly
classified, according to their purpose, into two complementary
sets of regulations (Troadec and Boncoeur 2003): (i) measures
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aimed at resource conservation and (ii) measures aimed at reg-
ulating the access to resources. To a large extent, fisheries man-
agement worldwide has rested exclusively on the first category
of measures, at least initially. Although such regulations have
proved indispensable, their eﬀectiveness has been limited by
the fact that they do not tackle the economic and institutional
roots of excess capacity. Economic diﬃculties and conflicts
have thus continued to develop, and resources are degraded
despite the existence of conservation measures. In addition,
the tense social climate resulting from excess capacity situa-
tions has often led to pressure being put on decision-makers to
water-down conservation objectives themselves. Hence, many
fisheries which have been conventionally managed for decades
continue to show poor performances (Hilborn et al. 2003).
As stressed in the latest report on the state of world fishery
resources published by the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (FAO 2007), there is growing recogni-
tion that the allocation of access rights to fisheries and fish
resources is at the heart of sustainable fisheries management.
Boncoeur et al. (2006) proposed a set of tools to regulate the
individual access to fish stocks, including the use of incentive-
based approaches resting on the definition of individual fishing
rights (Hilborn 2007; Clark 2006; Grafton 1996). In particular,
the implementation of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ)
has been proposed as a regulation measure which can produce
the incentives required for fishers to harvest fish stocks sus-
tainably (Arnason 1990). Moloney and Pearse (1979) explain
that fishers are expected to maximize profits within ITQ con-
straints, usually defined as shares of a given total allowable
catch (TAC). The transferability of fishing rights would lead
the most eﬃcient fishers to buy additional quota shares from
the least profitable fishing firms, thus reducing fishing capacity
and improving the economic eﬃciency of fleets (Copes 1986;
McCay 1995; Clark 2006).
Such a rationalization process may take several years, de-
pending on alternative opportunities for vessels and crews
(Campbell et al. 2000 and Grafton 1996) and on the degree of
transferability of quotas (Dewees 1998), but it is expected to
improve the overall profitability of fisheries and to reduce con-
flicts due to excess capacity. Increased profitability can also
result from improvement in the market value of fish landed.
A better market value, and hence a higher ex-vessel price re-
ceived by fishers for their catch, can be achieved in diﬀerent
ways, e.g. fish quality improvement by i) the use of less dam-
aging fishing gears (as expected for the Baltic Sea herring fish-
ery in Kulmala et al. 2007), ii) on-board processing, and iii) the
value of the catch, which can also be increased through price, if
fishing occurs in seasons with high prices or if fishers can tar-
get fish categories fetching higher prices; see Annala (1996)
for examples of fisheries implementing on-board processing
and changing fishing seasons to fit the market.
A number of potential problems arising from the imple-
mentation of ITQ schemes have also been highlighted; see
Copes (1986) for a comprehensive list of drawbacks of ITQ
systems. Some of these diﬃculties relate to output-based con-
trols. In particular, given individual catch constraints, fish-
ers may choose to discard the less valuable fish caught in
order to save their quota for more valuable fish (so-called
high-grading), thus leading to increased catches and fishing
Fig. 1. Location of the Tasmanian red rock lobster fishery and the
assessment areas.
mortality for given levels of landings. If undetected by catch
monitoring systems, high-grading may lead to “data fouling”,
which in turns leads to less reliable stock assessments and the
setting of TAC at unsustainable levels (Copes 1986). Other
diﬃculties relate to the social implications of the changes in
fisheries entailed by the adoption of ITQs, both in terms of re-
ductions in employment (Copes 1986 and McCay 1995) and
concentration of quota ownership. The latter has often led to
the adoption of measures aimed at limiting the aggregation of
quota shares (Dewees 1998). A key question which has also
been largely debated in various contexts concerns the initial
allocation of quota shares; see Arnason (2002) for an overview
of the diﬀerent allocation systems worldwide.
The fishery investigated in this paper is the Tasmanian red
rock lobster fishery (Australia). The fishing fleet is composed
of more than 200 vessels targeting red rock lobster (Jasus ed-
wardsii) in the State coastal waters (Fig. 1) during the oﬃcial
fishing year from March to February, with a seasonal closure
in October to protect males during moulting, and a ban on re-
taining females during the reproduction period from May to
September. Red rock lobsters returned to the water after cap-
ture are considered to survive the fishing process. The fish-
ery currently generates a gross revenue of about AUD 60 mil-
lion at first sale (ABARE 2008). The employment related to
the rock lobster industry in Tasmania was estimated at 1350
jobs in the early 2000s (Haddon and Gardner 2008). The TAC
of 1523 tonnes in 2008 is caught with baited traps. Most red
rock lobster caught in Tasmania is exported overseas (approx-
imately 74%, according to Bradshaw 2004) especially to the
live Chinese market, where the fishery is a “price-taker” sen-
sitive to Chinese prices. To match the Chinese market prices,
processors practice split prices in the fishery, with red rock lob-
ster categories depending essentially on two factors: size and
colour. These factors are closely linked to the spatial distribu-
tion of eﬀort based on two dimensions; the depth fished and the
latitude. Red rock lobsters are caught in shallow waters (less
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than 40 m depth) whereas lobsters caught in deeper waters are
“strawberry” to whitish in colour. The growth rate of red rock
lobster is highly variable spatially, with a positive growth gra-
dient from the southern to the northern regions of the State
(Punt et al. 1997). The diﬀerence in growth results in a size
gradient, with small rock lobsters in the south and bigger lob-
sters in the north. Due to the diﬀerence in growth rates, eight
areas are modelled and assessed separately, despite a State-
wide management (Fig. 1). Winter prices are also higher due
to a decline of international supply of southern red rock lobster
(mostly Australia and New Zealand; Annala 1996).
Tasmanian red rock lobster has been exploited for more
than two hundred years and was first managed in 1889 with
the “Fisheries Act”, following a decline in rock lobster abun-
dance (Winstanley 1973). Until 1967, only technical conserva-
tion measures were implemented, including gear restrictions,
minimum landing size, seasonal closure and a ban on the har-
vesting of egg-bearing females. The sustainability of the stock
remained questionable under those measures, which did not
prevent a continuous increase of fishing eﬀort. In an attempt
to curb this eﬀort, input restrictions were implemented from
the late 1960s onwards, which capped the number of fishing li-
cences and the number of traps used (Bradshaw 2004). Despite
these input controls, catch and catch rates continued to decline
in the fishery to a historically low level in 1994, and in 1996
the fishing industry voted in favour of an ITQ management
system for the Tasmanian red rock lobster fishery, after several
years of debate involving the industry, scientists and managers.
The ITQ system was implemented in 1998, and the initial al-
location was a particularly sensitive and strongly debated is-
sue (Ford and Nicol 2001). The final allocation was primarily
based on trap ownership, with a minor share of the quota al-
location based on catch history in such a way that, during the
first three years of the ITQ implementation, catch history ac-
counted for 9%, 5% and 2% of the TAC. Individual catch his-
tory was set as the sum of the best three years from the period
November 1988 to October 1997 (Ford and Nicol 2001). The
10 507 quota units are currently worth 145 kg each. To limit
aggregation of fishing rights, a 200 quota unit limit per quota
owner was implemented (fishery rules, Anonymous 2005).
Based on a literature review, we identified the key eﬀects
expected from the implementation of ITQs in a fishery dis-
playing excess capacity against which to confront the experi-
ence of the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery. We classified these
expected eﬀects in three broad categories:
• Fleet rationalization: following introduction of ITQs, less
eﬃcient vessels are expected to leave the fishery, leading to
a decrease in overall costs of harvesting and to an increase
in the economic eﬃciency of the fleet. Associated social
consequences relate in particular to potential reductions in
employment in the fishery (for examples of rationalization
Annala 1996; Arnason 1996, 2002 and 2005 and Grafton
1996);
• Changes in harvesting strategies: these relate to the fact
that fishers will seek to get the best value out of their
individual allocation, which may entail high-grading and
selection of areas, zones and fish targeted in order to
land catches at the highest possible prices (Annala 1996;
Arnason 2002 and Campbell et al. 2000);
• Concentration of landings and quota ownership: it has
been observed in various contexts where ITQs have been
adopted and is seen as a major social eﬀect of such systems
(Eythorsson 1996; Brandt 2005)
The objective of this paper is to examine the impacts of the
adoption of ITQs in the Tasmanian fishery for red rock lob-
ster (Jasus edwardsii) that have operated since 1998. Despite
a growing number of papers describing the eﬀect of ITQs all
over the world, fairly few studies have analysed the retrospec-
tive economic impacts of the introduction of ITQs. Apart from
the analysis of the halibut fishery in British Columbia by Casey
et al. (1995), we are not aware of any similar analysis of the
economic eﬀects of ITQs in a fishery. We present a retrospec-
tive analysis of the eﬀects of the adoption of ITQs, referring
to the main expected eﬀects of ITQ systems as they have been
proposed and discussed in the literature: i) the rationalization
of the fleet, ii) the change in fishing strategy and iii) the con-
centration of activity and quota ownership. Descriptive statis-
tics for key variables were produced and simple indices cal-
culated to measure changes in the status of the fishing fleet.
Variables considered include vessel numbers and characteris-
tics, fishing eﬀort, landings and sale prices.
2 Materials and methods
2.1 Data
Vessel data
Information on fishing vessels was compiled from several
databases. First, vessel characteristics since 2000 were col-
lected from the database of the Department of Primary In-
dustry and Water (DPIW), which manages Tasmanian natu-
ral resources. These characteristics include length, tonnage,
construction type and the home port of the vessels. The sec-
ond source of data was Marine and Safety Tasmania (MAST),
a statutory authority responsible for the operational safety of
recreational and commercial vessels of Tasmania. The MAST
database included information on length, gross tonnage, con-
struction year and horsepower for 2007. Information on vessel
characteristics was used for 1997 and beyond.
Catch-and-effort data
The catch and-eﬀort data analysed in this paper were ex-
tracted from the DPIW database, which consists of compul-
sory logbook data recorded daily by fishers since 1993. In ad-
dition to catch–and-eﬀort data, various spatial and technical
details concerning fishing trips are recorded in the database.
The catch- and-eﬀort time series were completed with monthly
aggregated historical data available for the period 1970-1992.
Price data
The monthly ex-vessel price of rock lobster was derived
from processor records, also collected by DPIW. Individual
processors must inform the Department of the average monthly
price at which they bought rock lobster from fishers and of
the amount of lobster bought per month. The monthly price of
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rock lobster was thus calculated as the average price paid by
individual processors weighted by the quantities of red rock
lobster bought. Nominal prices (i.e. non-deflated) were used
for the price analysis, while the Australian consumer price
index was used to deflate the total value of the fishery us-
ing 2006 as reference year (source: Reserve Bank of Australia
http://www.rba.gov.au).
2.2 Retrospective analysis
The retrospective analysis was carried out with the aim to
assess the changes observed in the fishery with respect to the
three broad categories of eﬀects, namely, rationalization of the
fleet, change in fishing strategies and concentration of activity
and fishing rights. Analyses are based on the compilation of
the diﬀerent data sets describing the evolution of the status
of the fishery over the last decade following implementation
of the scheme.
Analysis of the fleet
The evolution of the fleet in terms of total number and
composition was assessed through simple analysis of vessel
characteristics. Length and tonnage were the only characteris-
tics included in the analysis because of the quality of the cov-
erage of the data, respectively 100 and 95% of vessels covered.
Changes in fishing strategies
Several factors aﬀect the profit of the fishery: the operating
costs, the fixed costs and the revenue generated from fishing.
While fishers can hardly influence their fixed costs, they can
seek profit maximization by decreasing their operating costs,
depending on costs per unit of eﬀort and eﬀort, and increas-
ing the revenue from fishing, which mostly depends on the
price they received for their landings, given that the amount
of rock lobster landed is fixed by their quota shares. Unfor-
tunately, data were not available for costs which could not be
included in the analysis of the evolution of fishing strategies.
However, we did examine extensive time series and evolution
of revenue through catch and price. Changes in fishing strat-
egy were expected to occur with fishers seeking to maximise
the return from their quota allocation due to the existence of
market categories fetching diﬀerent prices (Frusher et al. 2003
and Bradshaw 2004). The market categories of a rock lobster
depend on several factors including (i) physical condition, (ii)
colour and (iii) weight resulting in “split” prices, with “pre-
mium” lobsters with a rigid shell (i.e. not soft due to recent
moulting), completely red in colour and weighing between 0.8
and 2 kg, receiving up to 10 Australian dollars more per kg
(C. Gardner, pers comm.). These characteristics are aﬀected
by spatial and temporal parameters, i.e. latitude, depth and sea-
son. To investigate potential changes in eﬀort allocation related
to premium prices, we compared the proportion of eﬀort in the
high-prices categories (premium size, shallow waters and win-
ter) for periods of 5 years before (1993-1997) and after (2002-
2006) introduction of the ITQ system.
Specific attention was devoted to rock lobster ex-vessel
price, with the aim to assess whether sale prices for rock lob-
ster had improved after the introduction of ITQs. The analy-
sis was carried out using the Hodrick-Prescott (Hodrick and
Prescott 1997) filter. This is used to identify long-term trends
in time series by decomposing a time series yt as the sum of a
trend component τt and a cyclical component ct: yt = τt + ct.
The filter finds the τt that minimizes the following expression
over the time series of length T :
min
τt
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
T∑
t=1
(yt − τt)2 + λ
T−1∑
t=2
[(τt+1 − τt) − (τt − τt−1)]2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
τt
.
Two terms are identified in this expression. The first term con-
strains the cyclical component and the second constrains the
trend component. The parameter λ influences the strength of
the penalty on the trend component. The lower the time step
between observations, the higher λ is in order to smoothen out
the series. The data analysed in this paper are available at a
monthly time step; the value for the λ parameter used in the
analysis is that recommended by Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
for monthly data, i.e. 14 400.
Evolution of activity and ownership concentration
The evolution of concentrations of activity and fishing
rights in the fishery was explored through methods commonly
used in economics to measure inequity of wealth distribution,
the Lorenz curve and the Gini index (Lorenz 1905 and Gini
1921).
3 Results: the effects of adopting ITQs
on the fishery
The introduction of ITQs in 1998 involved the setting of
a TAC which had not previously been implemented. The ini-
tial TAC was set at 1500 t, which was lower than the pre-ITQ
catch. In 2002, the TAC was raised to 1523 t (Haddon and
Gardner 2008).
Prior to the introduction of ITQs, total eﬀort and catch in-
creased mainly as a result of fishers building catch history,
while discussions went on regarding the implementation of the
scheme. This is supported by the reduction of eﬀort in the sum-
mer (November to February) of 1997, five months prior to the
introduction of the quota management scheme, which was not
taken into account in the definition of catch history.
Fishing eﬀort continued to decrease after the introduction
of quotas, in the absence of further regulations on the input
side (Fig. 2). Following adoption of the TAC, and the capping
of catch at a constant level, the stock has been rebuilding. This
has contributed to an increase in average catch rates (Fig. 2), as
in 2006/2007 fishers used 20% less trap-lifts to catch the TAC
than in 1998/1999 (Haddon and Gardner 2008).
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Table 1. Number of fishing vessels per length class.
Length class 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
10 m 39 28 18 12 10 10 10 9 8 6
10–18 m 271 244 225 217 214 208 207 202 199 193
>18 m 15 15 12 13 15 17 17 21 18 15
Total 325 287 255 242 239 235 234 232 225 214
Table 2. Contribution of length class to the total physical capacity of the fleet (gross tonnage) in percent.
Length class 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
10 m 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
10–18 m 84 81 85 84 83 83 83 79 82 83
>18 m 13 16 13 14 16 16 16 20 17 16
Fig. 2. Annual trend in eﬀort, catch and catch rates in Tasmanian red
rock lobster fishery.
3.1 Changes in the fishing fleet
Rationalization of the fleet
As expected, the size of the fishing fleet was reduced by
25%, from 325 to 242 vessels, in the first three years of quota-
based management (Table 1). It then stabilized around 240 ves-
sels until 2004 before a further decline, with the latest estimate
of the fleet size being 214 vessels in 2006. The number of traps
used by fishers is regulated and the amount of traps allowed
onboard varies from 15 to 50, depending on the size and gross
tonnage of the vessel (Anonymous 2005).
Characteristics of the vessels
The size composition of the fleet did change over the years,
as expected. Most vessels measure between 10 and 18 m in
length (Table 1), with the number of vessels in this fleet seg-
ment rising from 83% of the total fleet in 1997 to 90% in 2000.
Most of the vessels less than 10-m long left the fishery in the
first three years of quota: from the 39 vessels catching rock
lobster in 1997 only a third remained in 2000. The number of
the bigger vessels (>18 m) in the fleet remained the same, with
15 vessels in 2006 as in 1997 and even increased up to 21 in
2004. The evolution of the structure of the fleet can also be
considered in terms of contribution of size classes to the ca-
pacity of the fleet (gross tonnage), which was reduced more
strongly for the small vessels as shown in Table 2. While most
of the fleet’s capacity has been composed of vessels between
10 and 18 m and remained consistent at around 80% of the
fleet capacity, the proportion of capacity for bigger vessels has
varied, from 13% of fleet’s total tonnage in 1997 to 20% in
2004 and 16% in 2006 (Table 2).
This evolution of the size distribution of vessels could be
related to the development of winter fishing for the Asian mar-
ket in the early 1990s, which led to the construction of big-
ger vessels, more suitable for rougher winter and west coast
seas. It is also likely that the carrying limit of traps on board
influenced this distribution. Indeed, only vessels longer than
18 m and bigger than 30 t are allowed to carry the maximum
of 50 traps.
3.2 Changes in fishing strategy
Seasonal distribution of fishing activity
Like all crustaceans, red rock lobsters exhibit discontinu-
ous growth in size by periodic moulting. During the first stages
of moulting, when the carapace is extremely soft, lobsters re-
main in dens and do not feed. The combined stress of moulting
and fasting lowers the condition of the rock lobsters. The end
of the moulting period in November was historically the be-
ginning of the fishing season: once the exoskeleton begins to
harden, rock lobsters are highly catchable as they attempt to
replenish their food reserves. However, those rock lobsters are
in poor physical condition, and processors are often reluctant
to purchase them because of the large mortality rates suﬀered
during shipment to the Asian market. Softer lobsters are thus
normally retailed on the domestic market at lower prices.
The proportion of fishing eﬀort allocated to the winter sea-
son increased after the introduction of ITQs from a median
value of 39 to 46% of eﬀort allocated to winter months (Fig. 3).
Fishers’ response to the new regulation was extremely fast, and
it may have been facilitated by the change which occurred in
the regulatory dates of the management year. Managers de-
cided to set the oﬃcial fishing season from March to February
and opened fishing in September (but kept the seasonal clo-
sure in October for the moult), instead of the traditional fishing
season from November to August to encourage fishing in win-
ter (April to September) when prices are high. Indeed, keeping
quota for winter would have been risky, as catch rates are lower
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Fig. 3. Proportion of eﬀort resulting in catch of red rock lobster of
premium depth, season and size; the height noted above the bars rep-
resents the median, and the whiskers the min and max non-outlier
values. Before and after periods are respectively 1993-1997 and 2002-
2006.
and weather conditions can prevent fishers from going out to
sea. With the current fishing season starting in March, fishers
can plan their fishing calendar without fear of having a portion
of their quota uncaught at the end of the season. The variabil-
ity of the seasonal fishing allocation is relatively high due to
the fact that fishers are opportunistic and can change their fish-
ing plans depending on weather conditions or if winter prices
are not as high as expected (this happened during the severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Despite a high
variability in the proportion of winter allocation, it should be
noted that there is no overlap of the error bars between the
before and after periods (Fig. 3).
Fishing depth
The colour of rock lobster depends on the depth of its habi-
tat. In shallow waters (less than 40 m) the rock lobster is uni-
formly bright red. In depths greater than 40 m, rock lobsters
become paler and their appearance is speckled. Following in-
troduction of individual quotas, the proportion of fishing ef-
fort in shallow waters tended to increase, most probably due
to a targeting of these premium rock lobsters (Fig. 3); before
1998, around 70% of trap-lifts were made in shallow waters
and this proportion increased to 80% in the 2002-2006 period.
This change in eﬀort allocation to shallow waters also allowed
reduction in steaming time, and therefore fuel costs.
Lobster size
The fishing strategy regarding the size of targeted rock lob-
sters was calculated as the average lobster size per trip (to-
tal weight of lobster caught divided by their number). Before
1998, the proportion of trips with average lobster size in the
premium size range (0.8 to 2 kg) was slightly above 55%,
while the proportion of trips with premium average size has
grown to around 67% of total eﬀort since 1998 (Fig. 3). Three
factors might have led to the increase of average size of lob-
sters, (i) a lack of smaller lobsters in the north of the state,
where fishers and scientists have observed a decline in lob-
ster recruits in the past few years (Haddon and Gardner 2008);
(ii) animals left in the water growing further, increasing the
Fig. 4. Hodrick-Prescott filter of monthly ex-vessel prices of Tasma-
nian red rock lobster.
proportion of big lobsters in the water resulting from the re-
building of the stock, and (iii) fishers targeting specific sizes.
It is likely that all these factors combined are partly responsi-
ble for the increase in premium size in the landings. However,
no trend could be identified in the average size of lobster in
each management area (Fig. 1), suggesting that the targeting
of specific size classes is probably the main factor aﬀecting
average size in landings.
Contrary to expectations, there was no clear evidence that
high-grading has increased in the rock lobster fishery after the
introduction of individual quotas, and discards have been as-
sumed to have remained constant over the period. This was
checked against the new data system whereby fishers record
the number of lobsters put back in the water, and very little
discard was recorded. The only high-grading that occurs is the
discarding of big lobsters (more than 2 kg) because the beach
price of those lobster is much lower than for any other size
category, and this only occurred since 2004, when the cost of
leasing quota increased over AUD 20 per kg. However, dis-
carding has never been an issue in this fishery because lobsters
are released alive in the water causing no or very little mortal-
ity. Fishers can also target particular sizes by setting their pots
at diﬀerent latitudes (there is a south-north positive growth gra-
dient in the Tasmanian rock lobster population).
Consequences on ex-vessel prices and gross returns
Most Tasmanian rock lobster is exported to the Asian live
lobster market (Bradshaw 2004). The beach price of rock lob-
ster is therefore highly influenced by the Chinese market and
exchange rates. The trend line computed with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter applied to the nominal ex-vessel prices (Fig. 4)
shows an increase in lobster price in the early 1990s corre-
sponding to the development of exports of live Tasmanian rock
lobster to Asian markets. The decline observed in 2003 is due
to the SARS episode in Asia which aﬀected tourism and, as a
result, decreased the demand for high-value food products on
Asian markets (Harcourt 2003).
Because of this incident, it is diﬃcult to clearly identify
at the scale of the study period the long-term eﬀect of ITQs
on beach price for lobster, which could be expected from the
changes in the composition of landings. However, in the first
few years following the introduction of ITQs, the trend price
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Fig. 5. Exchange rate and Hodrick Prescott price trend.
Fig. 6. Variability of price cycle.
increased from around AUD 34 per kg (1995-1997) to more
than AUD 40 per kg in 2002 in nominal (non-deflated) terms.
The exchange rate with Hong-Kong is certainly the most im-
portant factor influencing the average ex-vessel prices, even
though there is some inconsistency at the end of the time se-
ries (Fig. 5). The price trend followed the exchange rate as
a mirror image, except for the few years after the SARS crisis
(2005-2007); during these years, lobster price continued grow-
ing despite an increasing exchange rate (Fig. 5).
The seasonal redistribution of eﬀort explains the strong
change observed in the intra-annual price variability for lob-
ster, shown by the cyclical pattern (Fig. 6). The variability of
ex-vessel prices (i.e. the diﬀerence between the annual max-
imum and minimum price) decreased from around AUD 30
before 1998 to less than AUD 20 after 1998. Overall, and ex-
cluding the SARS episode, winter prices are not as high as
before the introduction of ITQs, and summer prices are not as
low either and the intra-annual price variability has been sig-
nificantly reduced (Fig. 6). Higher summer prices are probably
related to a decrease in soft-shell landings in November.
The consequences of the price variation in terms of the to-
tal value of rock lobster catch can be estimated on the basis
of the product of the monthly catch and the average monthly
beach price (Fig. 7). To analyse the evolution of the value of
lobster catch, we consider deflated prices and correct gross
value by the Australian consumer price index (CPI) relative
to 2006 (CPI2006 = 1). The TAC, set in 1998, was below the
Fig. 7. Evolution of the total nominal and deflated value of Tasmanian
red rock lobster catch.
pre-ITQ catch and resulted in a decline in the total value of
the fishery in 1998 and 1999. The large increase in nominal
value of the catch in the following years (2000-2002) is a re-
sult of an advantageous exchange rate (Fig. 5). The drop ob-
served for the following years derived from the decrease in the
price of lobster due to SARS as the quantity landed did not
change. However, the last increase in total value (2005-2006
on Fig. 7) cannot be explained by the exchange rate (Fig. 5),
as the increasing exchange rate would have had the opposite
eﬀect. The individual quality of rock lobsters is most likely to
be the cause of the large increase in gross value product for
the period 2005-2006. The deflated gross value of the fishery
in 2006 is around the same level as at the introduction of ITQ
in 1998 despite the SARS accident (Fig. 7).
3.3 Concentration of rights and activity.
Concentration of quota was not regarded as a potential is-
sue in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery because the aggre-
gation limit per quota owner was set relatively low (2% of the
TAC, Anonymous 2005). This is confirmed when looking at
the concentration profile of ownership (Fig. 8a). As expected
from the theory, the distribution of quota shares in the fishery
was less equitable in 2006 than the initial allocation in 1998
but the Gini index, which is commonly used as a measure of
the inequity of distribution (Gini 1921), remained at a fairly
low level (0.36 in 2006). The extremely low level of the Gini
index at initial allocation (0.20) proves that the extensive de-
bate prior to implementation of the management scheme led
to an equitable repartition of fishing rights amongst industry
participants. It should be noted than the number of owners is
almost the same in 2006 as in 1998 (respectively 292 and 291)
and that the number of quota owners remained stable over the
period.
The concentration of activity, however, has not changed.
Despite a major decrease of the number of vessels in the fish-
ery, the catch (and therefore the TAC) has been distributed
evenly amongst the remaining operators and the distribution
of activity has been maintained at a relatively constant level
(Fig. 8b); this was also assessed by looking at the evolution of
Gini indices. Catch distribution exhibit low Gini index (around
0.35), suggesting a rather homogeneous distribution of catch
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Fig. 8. Concentration profiles of (a) quota ownership and (b) catch by vessel.
in the fishery. No change can be identified in the evolution of
the index, the concentration of catches having apparently re-
mained stable as the overlapping curves on Fig. 8b suggest. We
could have expected a distribution of eﬀort ‘flatter’ after 1998
as the less active vessels were expected to have left the fish-
ery but it seems that there were still fishers with low catches
operating in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery in 2006.
4 Discussion – Conclusion
The studies and debates over ITQs are still dividing scien-
tists, and the management system once presented as the ideal
management tool for sustainable fisheries is now considered as
a very eﬃcient scheme under certain given conditions. Grafton
and McIlgorm (2009) defined a formal framework for ex-ante
evaluation of a fishery before introduction of ITQs, based on
five criteria to ensure that the conditions for a successful ITQ
system were satisfied.
The Tasmanian rock lobster fishery would have passed the
five criteria they proposed. Firstly, the gross value of produc-
tion (GVP) was twenty times higher than the AUD 2 million
threshold they chose which could support the additional costs
related to management. Secondly, the rock lobster fishery is a
single-species fishery with very little by-catch, satisfying the
targeting ability required. Thirdly, the number of vessels in the
fishery was relatively small (just over 340 in 1993) but high
enough to allow competition in quota trading. Fourthly, there
is the ability to get premium products through seasonal and
spatial redistribution of eﬀort as discussed extensively in this
paper and, finally, the variability of the stock recruitment re-
lationship is rather low relative to harvest-eﬀort relationship
(Haddon and Gardner 2008). As a result, the Tasmanian rock
lobster fishery would have been considered a very good can-
didate for ITQs as are most fisheries with high-value products
(McIlgorm and Tsamenyi 2000).
ITQ was introduced in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery
as an attempt to limit the pressure on the stock and stop the
decline in biomass. According to the 2008 fishery assessment
report (Haddon and Gardner 2008), the management system
has been successful, with exploitable biomass doubling since
historical low record in 1994. The expected impacts on the
fishery identified in the literature were largely observed in the
Tasmanian rock lobster fishery, and fishers mostly behaved as
anticipated by the managers. The decrease of the fleet capacity
and of fishing eﬀort relieved the pressure on the stock, which
rebuilt over the period. The decrease of eﬀort should be re-
lated to operating costs and, even though the time series of
costs was not available, the decrease of fishing eﬀort by 30%
between 1997 and 2006 can be compared to the 28% increase
of CPI over the same period, which can be taken as a proxy for
operating costs. The number of vessels operating in the fish-
ery decreased dramatically by 25% during the first three years
of quota and further until the current size, slightly over 200
vessels, i.e. 60% of the initial fleet. The fishing vessels were
mostly made out of timber and sold as leisure sailing boats
because most valuable fisheries around Tasmania had been
locked down with a similar limited-entry scheme by the time
ITQs were implemented for rock lobster (Frusher et al. 2003).
The total fixed costs of the fishery are positively related with
the size of the fishing fleet. Although mostly smaller vessels
left the fishery, it can be assumed that, given the large amount
of vessels leaving, at worse the total fixed costs of the fishery
remained stable and they might even have decreased slightly.
The overall assessment of the fishery in terms of profit is
not very conclusive. The total profit of the fishery is likely to
have remained stable over the period when taking the infla-
tion into account, but owner-operators are probably better oﬀ
because fewer of them are sharing this profit. As Frusher et al.
(2003) observed by interviewing fishers in the industry, the sit-
uation of leasers is more complex because the profit is then
shared between the owner of the quota share and the fisher
through leasing price. Fishers have adapted their fishing be-
haviour to maximize the return per kg of rock lobster. The
analysis of the data confirms what Frusher et al. (2003) had
identified as emerging behaviours through interviews. Fishers
chose to reallocate their eﬀort, both spatially and temporally,
towards more valuable lobsters for export to Asia. This new
fishing strategy has had a direct eﬀect on the gross value of
the fishery which, despite the SARS accident, has been grow-
ing against the exchange rate for last few years of the period
studied.
While the Tasmanian rock lobster industry is satisfied
by the ITQ system (Treloggen, Tasmanian Rock Lobster
Fishermen’s Association’s executive oﬃcer, pers. comm.), the
change in fisher’s behaviour brought about by the ITQ sys-
tem has focused attention on the need for improved spatial
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management of the fishery to ensure productivity from opti-
mal harvest regions.
The implementation of an ITQ system has had an overall
positive impact in the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery. How-
ever, given how well it satisfied the required conditions stated
in Grafton and McIlgorm (2009), the results can be disappoint-
ing. The global trend in fisheries management still focuses to-
wards right-based management which is currently being in-
tensively discussed in the European Union as future common
policy. The lessons learned from the Tasmanian case study
show that, even if the fishery behaves in an expected way, un-
expected external perturbations can greatly impact the perfor-
mances of such a system.
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